Research Article

PERCEPTIONS OF BEHAVIORAL CONSISTENCY: Are People Aware of the Actor-Observer Effect?

Joachim Krueger, Jacob J. Ham, and Kirsten M. Linford

Brown University

Abstract—*Actors view behavior relevant for personality traits as more variable than observers do. This study was designed to replicate this actor-observer effect (AOE) in a common-target paradigm; test whether actors, observers, or both are intuitively aware of the AOE; and examine the effects of social projection on people's awareness of the AOE. Within each actor-observer pair, subjects described the actor on a series of trait adjectives and rated the consistency of relevant behavior. They then predicted the other person's ratings. The AOE emerged, and actors, but not observers, were aware of the effect. On average, actors correctly predicted that observers rated actors' behavior as more consistent than actors themselves did. Correlational analyses showed that actors and observers were equally prone to project their own ratings to their matched partners.*

Perceptions of human behavior depend, in part, on the perceiver's perspective. Observers, more than actors, tend to assume that past behavior predicts future behavior and to ascribe stable personality characteristics liberally (Nisbett, Caputo, Legant, & Marecek, 1973). This actor-observer effect (AOE) is a pervasive phenomenon in social perception (Watson, 1982). Various attentional, informational, and motivational processes have been invoked to explain the AOE. Actors primarily attend to the situational context in which a behavior occurred, whereas observers attend to the actor as the source of behavior (Storms, 1973). Actors have greater access to their own behavioral history with its variations across situations than observers do (Prentice, 1990). Finally, actors, more than observers, may be motivated to view themselves as responsive to and thus in control of situational demands (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977).

Most studies of the AOE have used a common-rater paradigm (CRP), in which subjects rate themselves (actor's perspective) and someone else (observer's perspective). Nisbett et al. (1973) used rating scales with two poles referring to opposite personality traits and the middle representing a situational attribution. Subjects chose the middle response more often when describing themselves than when describing others. Goldberg (1978, 1981) cautioned that a middle rating may indicate not only attributions of variability but also uncertainty about the applicability or the meaning of the trait. Baxter and Goldberg (1987) presented a two-step scale in which subjects rated how characteristic the trait was of the target person (self or other) and separately whether the person was consistently at the rated level or whether there was variability across time or situations. The AOE survived when the measurement confounds were removed. Regardless of level, subjects rated themselves as less consistent than they rated others.

Still, the AOE is difficult to interpret in the CRP because there is no control over whom subjects imagine as the "other." Possibly, people who are particularly consistent come to mind more easily than variable ones. The first goal of this study was to remove this ambiguity by using a common-target paradigm (CTP), in which the target person is held constant while the perspective (actor vs. observer) varies between subjects. Subjects participate in pairs, with one person arbitrarily designated as the actor and the other designated as the observer. Both subjects rate the actor. Should the AOE emerge in this paradigm, the effect can be considered robust for it cannot be attributed to sampling biases when subjects evoke the "average other." The second goal was to test the idea that people have an intuitive grasp of the AOE. Perhaps actors, observers, or both realize that perceptions of behavioral consistency depend, in part, on the rater's perspective.

AWARENESS OF THE AOE

A few examples may illustrate that people seem to be intuitively aware of some of the errors and biases in social perception. Dawes, Singer, and Lemons (1972) found that subjects realized that people consider the attitudes of others with whom they disagree to be more extreme than their own. Wegener and Petty (1993) concluded that subjects are often aware of judgmental contrast effects (e.g., average folks do not look so pretty when compared with models) because they can correct for these effects when properly instructed to do so. Krueger and Zeiger (1993) demonstrated subjects' awareness of the false consensus effect (i.e., social projection). Subjects correctly inferred, for example, that someone who thought that most people like poetry was more likely to be a poetry lover than someone who thought that few people like poetry.

Nisbett et al. (1973) found some tantalizing evidence for actors' awareness of the AOE. Actor subjects attributed choices they had made largely to the characteristics of the presented alternatives, but attributed their friends' choices to their friends' dispositions (i.e., the AOE). Interestingly, actors realized that their friends, as observers, would attribute the subjects' choices to the subjects' dispositions. Because there were no observer-subjects in this study, it was not possible to test whether observers realized that actors preferred situational explanations of their own behavior. It is important to ask whether actors and observers are aware of the AOE because this effect is linked most directly to interpersonal behavior and communication. Some conflicts arise from an observer's impression that the actor consistently engages in some unpleasant behavior

Address correspondence to Joachim Krueger, Department of Psychology, Brown University, Box 1853, Providence, RI 02912; e-mail: joachim_krueger@brown.edu. Jacob Ham is now at the University of Massachusetts at Boston.

(Galper, 1976). To the extent that observers can be induced to see the behavior as the actor sees it (i.e., as less consistent), the potential for conflict decreases. Similarly, actors may realize that observers judge actors' behavior to be more consistent than the actors themselves do.

The CTP (unlike the CRP) offers an opportunity to examine awareness of the AOE among both actors and observers: Do actors think that observers rate them as more consistent than actors rate themselves? Do observers think that actors rate themselves as less consistent than they, the observers, rate them? On the one hand, it is possible that awareness of the AOE is symmetrical because all people regularly make person judgments from both actor and observer perspectives. On the other hand, awareness may be asymmetrical. Not only may there be attentional, informational, or motivational differences between actors and observers, but also the different orientations may differ in their mutability. Consider informational differences. Actors have more experience from which they can judge the variability of their own behavior than observers do. To adopt the observer's perspective, actors need to reduce the amount of available information. To adopt the actor's perspective, observers need to fill in information they do not have. If the former is easier than the latter, awareness of the AOE will be asymmetrical.

SOCIAL PROJECTION AND THE AOE

Asking how distinct social-perceptual biases may be interrelated is more fruitful than studying such biases in isolation. Ross et al. (1977) examined the false consensus effect with a view to its implications for the AOE. Most people project their own characteristics to others who are members of the same group. Others who are indeed different stand out as odd and deviant (Krueger & Clement, 1994). To the extent that people perceive lower consensus for the actions of others than for their own, they will be more tempted to attribute dispositions to others than to themselves (Kelley, 1967). In this way, social projection contributes to the emergence of the AOE if the other acts differently than the self.

In the CRP, high correlations between the willingness to ascribe stable personality traits to self and to others indicate projection (Blass & Kaplowitz, 1990; Funder, 1980; Goldberg, 1981; Nisbett et al., 1973). The more consistent actors see themselves, the more consistent they see others. If projection is very strong, it may inhibit the AOE. The third goal of this study was to examine if social projection also affects the awareness of the AOE. Jones and Nisbett (1971) speculated that both actors' and observers' perceptions of behavior are egocentric. Actors and observers not only will assume that behavior flows from the situation or the actor, respectively, but also will assume that their perceptions are shared by others (p. 86). We therefore hypothesized that in the CTP, (a) actors will project by assuming that observers rate them as they, the actors, rate themselves, and (b) observers will assume that actors rate themselves as they, the observers, rate them. The more people project when predicting the consistency ratings made by others, the less likely they are to see differences between their own and others' perspectives—that is, the less likely they are to be aware of the AOE.

To review, the present study was designed to replicate the AOE in the CTP, test whether subjects are aware of the effect, and examine the role of social projection in subjects' attempts at perspective taking. Subjects participated in pairs; within each pair, the 2 subjects rated the same member of the pair and also predicted each other's ratings. Actors rated themselves and how they thought their roommates rated them; observers rated actors and how they thought the actors would rate themselves. Projection was assessed (Do actors expect to be rated by observers the way they, the actors, rate themselves? Do observers expect actors to rate themselves the way they, the observers, rate actors?). The accuracy of predicted consistency ratings was also assessed (Do actors rate themselves as observers think they do? Do observers rate actors as actors think they do?), as was the agreement between actors and observers (Do observers rate actors as actors rate themselves?).

METHOD

Subjects

One hundred sixty college freshmen and sophomores (60% women, mean age = 18.5 years) participated as volunteers. They were approached in their dormitory rooms, and most agreed to participate with their same-sex roommates, one pair at a time. The aim of the selection procedure was to obtain a sample in which subjects belonging to the same pair liked each other and knew each other well. It was expected that high levels of liking and familiarity would work against the AOE (Goldberg, 1978, 1981; Nisbett et al., 1973; Prentice, 1990). If obtained under these conditions, the AOE would prove to be robust. Within each pair of subjects, one was arbitrarily designated the actor and the other the observer.

Stimuli and Design

Eighteen person-descriptive adjectives that showed the AOE in Baxter and Goldberg's (1987) study were selected and listed alphabetically. These adjectives were *benevolent, brilliant, fidgety, forward, happy, imitative, impulsive, inconsistent, innovative, inquisitive, particular, patient, pretentious, sarcastic, selfish, self-satisfied, sophisticated*, and *vibrant*. In a 2 × 2 design, both variables were assessed in dependent samples. Actors and observers received two forms of the trait list. In one form (*own ratings*), both subjects rated the actor. In the other form (*predicted ratings*), actors predicted how observers rated them, and observers predicted how actors rated themselves.

Procedures and Measures

If the experimenter encountered both roommates and both agreed to participate, the subject to the experimenter's right was the designated actor, and the one on the left was the observer. Depending on their designation, subjects then received either the actor or the observer form of the questionnaire. Subjects were not told whom their roommates were rating. The questionnaire had three parts: own ratings, predicted ratings,

and social desirability ratings. The order of the first two ratings was varied across subjects.

The experimenter introduced the two-step rating scale (adapted from Baxter & Goldberg, 1987), which remained on display throughout the session. Subjects rated how characteristic the trait was (i.e., *trait level*) on a scale from −3 (*very uncharacteristic*) to +3 (*very characteristic*). A zero indicated an average level of characteristicness. Next, subjects rated whether the actor displayed the trait consistently at the rated level (i.e., *consistency*). To indicate consistency, subjects were instructed to enter a "C." If they perceived the actor as being more extreme than the rated level on some occasions and less extreme on others (i.e., as variable), they were instructed to enter an "E." Subjects also had the option to indicate that they did not know the meaning of the term ("M") or how characteristic it was ("D").

On the own-ratings form, actors were asked to "describe how you perceive yourself on the following person-descriptive adjectives." Observers were asked to "describe how you perceive your roommate." To make predicted ratings, actors were asked to "put yourself in your roommate's position. . . . Imagine and rate how your roommate would describe you." Observers were asked to "imagine and rate how your roommate would describe himself or herself." Finally, subjects rated the social desirability of each trait from the actor's perspective (from 1, *very undesirable*, to 9, *very desirable*).

RESULTS

Neither the sex of the subjects nor the order in which the ratings were made had any effect on the results. Roommates seemed to know each other well and to feel comfortable in rating behavioral consistency. They rarely chose either of the uncertainty (M or D) responses (actors: 1%, observers: 2%). Even in the predictions of each others' ratings, uncertainty was low (4% and 2% for actors and observers, respectively). To assess the favorability of person descriptions, we computed correlations between the rated trait level and the average social desirability ratings for each subject and submitted these correlations to *r-Z-r* transformations. Actors described themselves positively (mean $r = .39$, $SD = .32$) and were described positively by the observers (mean $r = .52$, $SD = .40$). Similarly, actors predicted that observers would describe them positively (mean $r = .43$, $SD = .48$), and observers predicted that actors would describe themselves positively (mean $r = .59$, $SD = .42$). A 2 (rater: actor, observer) × 2 (rating type: own, predicted) analysis of variance (ANOVA) for dependent samples was performed on the *Z* scores. Only the effect of rater was reliable, $F(1, 79) = 20.13$, $p < .001$, reflecting the finding that ratings made by observers were more positive than ratings made by actors. In sum, these results confirmed that subjects, within pairs, were familiar with and liked each other.

Table 1. *Mean consistency proportions for actors and observers: Own and predicted ratings*

	Rating type	
Rater	Own	Predicted
Actor	54.46 (22.47)	63.71 (21.74)
Observer	63.79 (20.11)	64.27 (22.26)

Note. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.

The first main question was whether the AOE would emerge when the actor was held constant. To create an index of rated behavioral consistency for each trait, we divided the number of raters who gave a C rating by the number of raters who gave either C ratings or E ratings. We then subtracted the consistency indices for actors from the indices for observers so that positive differences indicated the AOE. Averaged across traits, the difference ($M = .10$, $SD = .11$) was similar to the one obtained in the CRP ($M = .13$, $SD = .05$; Baxter & Goldberg, 1987). Across traits, however, the differences were uncorrelated, $r(16) = .05$. Negative correlations with the mean social desirability ratings (this study: $r[16] = -.21$, n.s.; Baxter & Goldberg: $r[16] = -.56$, $p < .05$) suggest that actors stressed the consistency of their positive traits (self-enhancement) and the variability of their negative traits (self-protection). Alternatively, these correlations may reflect a tendency among observers to view actors' negative traits as particularly consistent.

Separate consistency proportions (CPs) were then computed for each subject's own ratings and predicted ratings. To obtain these indices, we divided the number of traits with a C response by the number of traits with a C or an E response ($C/[C + E]$). The means and standard deviations of the CPs are shown in Table 1. A 2 (rater: actor, observer) × 2 (type of rating: own, predicted) ANOVA for dependent samples was performed on the CPs. The interaction was reliable, $F(1, 79) = 6.76$, $p < .02$. A simple comparison for own ratings yielded the AOE: Actors had lower CPs than did observers, $F(1, 79) = 7.21$, $p < .01$, and the effect size was medium ($d = .44$). The simple comparison for the predicted ratings was not reliable, $F < 1$.

The second question was whether actors, observers, or both were aware of the AOE. The mean CPs for own and predicted ratings were compared separately for the two groups of raters. Among actors, the CPs were reliably higher for predicted than for own ratings, $F(1, 79) = 13.76$, $p < .001$. Thus, actors seemed to realize that their roommates viewed them as being more consistent than the actors viewed themselves. In contrast, observers seemed unaware that their roommates viewed themselves to be less consistent than they, the observers, viewed them, $F < 1$.[1]

There were substantial individual differences in perceptions of behavioral consistency (see *SD*s in Table 1). Correlations of the four sets of CPs were computed across subjects and revealed projection. Actors who viewed themselves as mostly consistent also expected to be seen as mostly consistent by their matched observers, $r(78) = .49$, $p < .001$. Similarly, observers who viewed their matched actors as mostly consistent expected these actors to share their views, $r(78) = .62$, $p < .001$. All other correlations were unreliable.

1. The main effect for type of rating was also reliable, $F(1, 79) = 9.77$, $p < .01$, but the effect of rater was not, $F(1, 79) = 2.81$, $p > .09$.

Table 2. *Mean within-subjects and within-pairs correlations (ϕ) between consistency ratings across traits*

	Actor: Own	Actor: Predicted	Observer: Own
Actor: Predicted	Actors' projection .26* (.33)	—	
Observer: Own	Agreement/validity .03 (.26)	Actors' accuracy .10 (.29)	—
Observer: Predicted	Observers' accuracy .05 (.24)	.12 (.29)	Observers' projection .26* (.31)

Note. Standard deviations of Z scores are given in parentheses.
*$p < .001$.

Ratings of consistency (C) versus variability (E) were then correlated across traits and within subjects (and within pairs). These analyses tested the questions included in our third goal: Were the ratings that subjects predicted for their roommates correlated with subjects' own ratings (projection)? Were subjects' predicted ratings correlated with their roommates' own ratings (accuracy)? and Were actors' and observers' own ratings correlated (agreement)? Table 2 shows that only the within-subjects correlations were reliable. When predicting whether their roommates would rate them as consistent or variable on a particular trait, actors projected their own judgments to their matched observers. Similarly, observers expected actors to rate themselves as consistent on the same traits that the observers selected for C ratings. Predictions were not accurate, and actors' ratings of trait consistency or variability did not agree with observers' ratings.

The pattern was replicated for ratings of trait level, but the correlations were higher. Own and predicted ratings were strongly correlated, indicating projection (actors: mean $r = .69$, $SD = 49$; observers: mean $r = .76$, $SD = 45$). Agreement between actors' and observers' own ratings (mean $r = .39$, $SD = 37$) and the accuracy of the predictions (actors: mean $r = .45$, $SD = 35$; observers: mean $r = .39$, $SD = 41$) were intermediate (all $ps < .001$). Because agreement and accuracy were not zero, they may have contributed to the projection correlations. To test whether predictions were truly projective, we recomputed the within-subjects correlations between own and predicted level ratings while partialing out the roommates' own ratings (i.e., the criterion of prediction). For both actors and observers, these partial correlations were smaller than their corresponding zero-order correlations, but they remained highly reliable (all $ps < .001$). Actors' predictions of how observers rated them were largely projections (mean partial $r = .63$, $SD = 45$), and so were observers' predictions of how actors rated themselves (mean partial $r = .71$, $SD = 48$).

DISCUSSION

The AOE proved to be robust. It emerged when confounds between level ratings and consistency ratings were avoided (see also Baxter & Goldberg, 1987), when subjects were arbitrarily assigned the perspective of actor or observer, and when members of each pair were familiar with and liked each other. Most important, there was an asymmetrical awareness of the AOE. Actors, but not observers, seemed to realize the consequences of the others' perspective on perceptions of behavioral consistency.

To further examine this asymmetry, let us consider the mechanisms that have been invoked to explain the AOE. The first mechanism, attentional focus, has been considered relevant primarily for causal explanations of specific behavioral acts. Efforts to achieve a symmetrical reversal of the AOE have been successful. In Storms's (1973) study, actor subjects were more likely to attribute their actions to dispositional causes after watching themselves on video. Observer subjects were more likely to attribute actions to situational causes after seeing a video taken from the actor's perspective (see also Duval & Wicklund, 1973). Galper (1976) presented subjects with a dramatic sketch of heroic behavior. With the available information being the same, half the subjects rated the importance of situational and dispositional factors as causes of the observed behavior (standard observer condition), whereas the other half attempted to empathize with the actor and rate the causes as he would. In the empathy condition, situational rather than dispositional causes were rated most relevant (see also Regan & Totten, 1975). These studies show that a shift in focus, be it a literal perceptual shift or a symbolic empathic shift, can turn actors' judgments into those of observers and vice versa.

In the present study, subjects did not make causal attributions for specific behaviors. Instead, they rated whether or not the actor exhibited specific traits consistently. Such ratings require a memory search for relevant episodes (Smith, 1984). Thus, the second mechanism, informational disparities, seems most directly relevant to explain the AOE in trait ratings in this study. Informational disparities have only rarely been manipulated. Presenting different memory probes, Frank and Gilovich (1989) asked subjects to recall previous conversations either from their original perspective ("as they saw it") or from an observer's perspective ("much like an outsider observer would see you"). In the latter more than in the former perspective, subjects concluded that their conversational behavior had been driven more by their dispositions and less by the situations. Also, as noted, Nisbett et al. (1973) found a reversal of the AOE

(i.e., awareness) among actor subjects. There were no observer subjects in these studies.

The present study showed that simple empathy instructions are sufficient to alter actors', but not observers' consistency/variability ratings. What kinds of mental representations of own and other's behavior may underlie the AOE, and how may they explain the asymmetry of the empathy effects? Suppose specific behaviors are stored in memory with a tag indicating the trait they represent (Smith & Zárate, 1992). According to such an exemplar-based model of judgment, trait ratings depend on the distribution of recalled behaviors. The central tendency indicates the level, and the scatter indicates the consistency. Linville, Fischer, and Salovey (1989) applied such a model to intergroup perception. They argued that (a) members have more information about a group than do nonmembers, and (b) extreme exemplars (in this case, people) are more memorable than average exemplars. These two assumptions were sufficient to explain the common finding of perceived out-group homogeneity.

The same mechanisms that produce the perceptions of outgroup homogeneity may produce perceptions of behavioral consistency in individual others. By and large, actors have more behavioral information about each of their own traits than observers do. If extreme behaviors are more memorable than are neutral ones (e.g., Krueger & Rothbart, 1990), actors' perceptions of consistency will be lower than observers' perceptions. To simulate actors' and observers' predictions of each others' ratings, one need only assume that actors randomly remove behavioral exemplars from each trait-related distribution and that observers randomly add exemplars. Actors need only ignore some of the information they have about themselves. If they randomly remove exemplars from a known distribution, some outliers will likely be discarded. The resulting reduction of the range may lead to replacement of variability ratings by consistency ratings. Observers, in contrast, need to generate information they do not have. They may add exemplars within the known behavioral range but fail to add outliers that would increase the range of the familiar behavioral distribution. If the range of behaviors does not increase, no ratings of consistency need to be replaced by ratings of variability. This speculative version of the informational account of AOE may thus explain the asymmetry in subjects' awareness of the effect. The influence of the third mechanism, motivational orientation, remains to be investigated.

The presented correlational analyses support the idea that subjects' predictions are in part random. Although actors realized that observers rated them to be more consistent than they, the actors, rated themselves, they did not realize where the differences lay. When predicting observers' ratings, actors simply seemed to replace, rather indiscriminately, variability ratings with consistency ratings. They closed the numerical gap between their own and observers' ratings, but they did not improve accuracy. There was neither agreement between actors' and observers' own ratings nor any correlation between actors' predicted ratings and observers' own ratings. Similarly, the accuracy correlations for observers were near zero. That is, the analyses of the CPs across traits revealed that neither actors nor observers were knowledgeable about the precise behavioral information their matched partners had. The random exchange of consistency and variability ratings was tempered by reliable—and symmetrical—social projection. Predicting the other person's ratings, both actors and observers relied on their own perceptions.

A final comment is due on the assessment of social projection in this study. In research on the false consensus effect, social projection is defined as people's exaggerated expectations that others are like them (Krueger & Zeiger, 1993). In contrast, the present approach focused on the similarities between people's own ratings of an actor (self or other) and their expectations about how another person would rate the actor. Actors and observers expected their respective counterparts to rate the actors as they themselves did. Because observers did not describe themselves on the set of trait adjectives, the present design did not examine the similarities between self- and other-descriptions within subjects (see Robins, Spranca, & Mendelsohn, in press, for a round-robin design). A voluminous literature on projection shows, however, that observers exaggerate the similarities between their own characteristics and those of people belonging to the same group (Krueger & Clement, 1996). It is therefore highly probable that observers' own ratings of the actors were biased by observers' self-images. Because projection engages strong pressures toward perceptions of interpersonal similarity, it is remarkable that the AOE emerged, just as Jones and Nisbett foretold in 1971.

Acknowledgments—We are indebted to Russ Clement and Rashmi Sinha for many helpful comments on a draft version of this article. A portion of this research was presented at the 66th Annual Meeting of the Eastern Psychological Association, Boston, March 1995.

REFERENCES

Baxter, T.L., & Goldberg, L.R. (1987). Perceived behavioral consistency underlying trait attributions to oneself and another: An extension of the actor-observer effect. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 13,* 437–447.

Blass, T., & Kaplowitz, H. (1990). A longitudinal study of the actor-observer attributional effect. *Personality and Individual Differences, 11,* 259–264.

Dawes, R.M., Singer, D., & Lemons, F. (1972). An experimental analysis of the contrast effect and its implications for intergroup communication and the indirect assessment of attitude. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 21,* 281–295.

Duval, S., & Wicklund, R.A. (1973). Effects of objective self-awareness on attribution of causality. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 9,* 17–31.

Frank, M.G., & Gilovich, T. (1989). Effect of memory perspective on retrospective causal attributions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57,* 399–403.

Funder, D.C. (1980). The "trait" of ascribing traits: Individual differences in the tendency to trait ascription. *Journal of Research in Personality, 14,* 376–385.

Galper, R.E. (1976). Turning observers into actors: Differential causal attributions as a function of "empathy." *Journal of Research in Personality, 10,* 328–335.

Goldberg, L.R. (1978). Differential attribution of trait-descriptive terms to oneself as compared to well-liked, neutral, and disliked others: A psychometric analysis. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36,* 1012–1028.

Goldberg, L.R. (1981). Unconfounding situational attributions from uncertain, neutral, and ambiguous ones: A psychometric analysis of descriptions of oneself and various types of others. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41,* 517–552.

Jones, E.E., & Nisbett, R.E. (1971). The actor and the observer: Divergent perceptions of the causes of behavior. In E.E. Jones, D.E. Kanouse, H.H. Kelley, R.E. Nisbett, S. Valins, & B. Weiner (Eds.), *Attribution: Perceiving the causes of behavior* (pp. 79–94). Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press.

Kelley, H.H. (1967). Attribution theory in social psychology. In D. Levine (Ed.), *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation* (Vol. 15, pp. 192–241). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Krueger, J., & Clement, R.W. (1994). The truly false consensus effect: An ineradicable and egocentric bias in social perception. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67*, 596–610.

Krueger, J., & Clement, R.W. (1996). Inferring category characteristics from sample characteristics: Inductive reasoning and social projection. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 125*, 52–68.

Krueger, J., & Rothbart, M. (1990). Contrast and accentuation effects in category learning. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59*, 651–663.

Krueger, J., & Zeiger, J.S. (1993). Social categorization and the truly false consensus effect. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65*, 670–680.

Linville, P.W., Fischer, G.W., & Salovey, P. (1989). Perceived distributions of in-group and out-group members: Empirical evidence and a computer simulation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57*, 165–188.

Nisbett, R.E., Caputo, C., Legant, P., & Marecek, J. (1973). Behavior as seen by the actor and by the observer. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 27*, 154–164.

Prentice, D.A. (1990). Familiarity and differences in self- and other-representations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59*, 369–383.

Regan, D.T., & Totten, J. (1975). Empathy and attribution. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32*, 850–856.

Robins, R.W., Spranca, M.D., & Mendelsohn, G.A. (in press). The actor-observer effect revisited: Effects of individual differences and repeated social interactions on actor and observer attributions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*.

Ross, L., Greene, D., & House, P. (1977). The "false consensus effect": An egocentric bias in social perception and attribution processes. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 13*, 279–301.

Smith, E.R. (1984). Attributions and other inferences: Processing information about the self versus others. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 20*, 97–115.

Smith, E.R., & Zárate, M.A. (1992). Exemplar-based models of social judgment. *Psychological Review, 99*, 3–21.

Storms, M.D. (1973). Videotape and the attribution process: Reversing actors' and observers' points of view. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 27*, 154–164.

Watson, D. (1982). The actor and the observer: How are their perceptions of causality different? *Psychological Bulletin, 92*, 682–700.

Wegener, D.T., & Petty, R.E. (1993). Flexible correction processes in social judgment: Correcting for context-induced contrast. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 29*, 137–165.

(RECEIVED 5/1/95; ACCEPTED 7/21/95)