Liking persons versus liking groups: a dual-process hypothesis

RUSSELL W. CLEMENT
and JOACHIM KRUEGER*

*Department of Psychology, Brown University,
U.S.A.*

Abstract

Most research on liking of persons and groups has been conducted within separate paradigms, but the implicit assumption has been that the same processes govern judgments of liking or disliking regardless of the nature of the target. Departing from this assumption, we suggest a dual-process hypothesis according to which people base their liking of a target person primarily on the desirability of the person's characteristics, whereas they base their liking of a group primarily on the degree of similarity between the group and themselves. To test this hypothesis, participants were presented with either positively or negatively valenced sketches that either described an individual person or a group of people. Path analyses revealed that liking of a person was best predicted by desirability ratings, whereas liking of a group was best predicted by similarity ratings. Implications of these findings for stereotype maintenance are discussed. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

INTRODUCTION

> I have ever hated all nations, professions, and communities, and all my love is toward individuals ... Principally I hate and detest that animal called man, although I heartily love John, Peter, Thomas and so forth.
> (Swift, 1725, in a letter to Pope; cited in Swift, 1967, p. xiii).

People, as individuals or as groups, are the primary objects of social perception, and evaluative responses are integral parts of that perception. Not surprisingly, much of social perception research is concerned with the favourability of the percept, or more

generally, with liking. What is surprising, however, is that research on person perception has made little contact with research on group perception. Different paradigms, and hence different questions, have dominated these two areas. Much of the research on person perception is cast in the impression formation paradigm, which seeks to understand how people come to like another person. In contrast, much of the research on group perception is cast in the stereotype paradigm, which seeks to understand how people come to dislike groups (and outgroups in particular). The way these questions are posed reflects a sentiment that is deeply rooted in Western thinking, namely that individual persons are to be preferred over groups. Notable writers, such as Swift, Nietzsche, Freud, and Jung shared this view. Le Bon (1910) drew the distinction most sharply when he noted that 'isolated, (a man) may be a cultivated individual, in a crowd, he is a barbarian' (p. 36).

Because it is difficult to compare findings across paradigms, it is important to study person perception and group perception within the same framework. Recognizing this need for integrative work, Sears (1983) proposed that individual persons and groups vary along a continuum of perceived 'personhood'. Because individual persons, by definition, have more of this quality than groups do, they are more similar to the perceiver. Similarity is widely assumed to breed liking, and therefore, 'individual persons should usually be evaluated more favourably than groups or aggregates of the same individuals' (p. 237). Person-positivity biases have been demonstrated for the liking of politicians, women, teachers, immigrants, felons, the elderly, and former mental patients (Nilsson & Ekehammar, 1987; Miller & Felicio, 1990; Klaghofer, Oser, & Patry, 1987; Moore, 1993; Ellsworth & Ross, 1983; Green, 1981; Desforges, Lord, Ramsey, Mason, van Leauwen, West, & Lepper, 1991, respectively).

The person-positivity bias raises both hopes and concerns. One important hope is that negative stereotypes will not necessarily generalize to individual group members. A related concern is that stereotypes may persist even after contact with likeable group members. The notorious rigidity of anti-Semitic attitudes exemplifies this phenomenon. Abstract anti-Semitism is the belief that 'the Jewish people are socially inferior, religiously perverse, or morally corrupt' (Dershowitz, 1997, p. 76). A person who holds this belief may also truthfully claim that 'some of my best friends are Jews'.[1] Similar discrepancies between person perception and group perception have been reported to occur in the context of other stereotypes, as for example, African-Americans (Du Bois, 1997/1903).

A Critique of Person-Positivity

The key assumption of the person-positivity hypothesis is that a single psychological process—that similarity breeds liking—governs the liking of persons and groups. To

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[1]Abstract anti-Semitism can be distinguished from personalized anti-Semitism. Whereas the former can be understood as a manifestation of the person-positivity bias, the latter is its inverse. Dershowitz relates an old joke to illustrate how these two biases may interact with ingroup–outgroup categorizations. ' "What is the difference between an anti-Semite and a Jew?" The answer: An anti-Semite will tell you that "the Jewish people are dishonest, untrustworthy, and moneygrubbing", but when you ask him about his neighbour Cohen, he will say, "Cohen's an exception, as honest as they come": the Jew will praise the Jewish people as "the best, the most charitable, and the most honest people in the world", but when you ask him about his neighbour Levine, he will say, "That no-good crook, you can't trust him as far as you can throw him" ' (pp. 76–77).

test this idea, other differences between persons and groups need to be minimized. The necessary level of experimental control has not been achieved, however, as is illustrated by a brief review of the principal design features.

First, Sears (1983) did not control sampling biases. The 26 presented politicians did not include Richard Nixon or any of his associates. Yet, when participants listed politicians that came to mind, 18 per cent were 'those likely to be thought rascals' (p. 244). Sears also reported that 'Americans have invariably evaluated their own individual congressmen predominantly favourably, whereas their evaluations of Congress as a whole have been predominantly negative' (p. 234). This comparison is difficult to interpret because it introduces differences in familiarity and individuation. Increases in familiarity or individuation can increase liking without concurrent increases in similarity. People tend to rate those individuals more favourably whom they have met or expect to meet (Darley & Berscheid, 1967). Merely viewing the back of a person's head is sufficient to increase the liking of that person (Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995).

Second, when judging a group, it is not clear whether raters rely only on the information presented about specific members or whether they resort in part to abstract stereotypes. Negative stereotypes may diminish the liking of a group of people. In Miller and Felicio's (1990) study, the 'beautiful-is-good' stereotype may have affected the ratings of attractive and unattractive women. A group of individuals is more likely than a single person to activate a stereotype, leading to more stereotypic evaluations (Devine, 1989). Therefore, comparisons between an individual person and a group may in part be comparisons between a person and a group stereotype.

Third, comparisons between the liking of a group and the liking of its members not only involve different social targets (one versus many) but also different levels of categorization (parts versus whole). Figure 1 illustrates this problem. Whereas ratings of groups are of the type shown in the lower right cell ('Group'), ratings of individuals can either be of the type shown in the upper right cell ('Person') or of the type shown in the lower left cell ('Members'). Thus, the person-positivity bias could either arise from differences in the social target (the vertical comparison), from differences in social categorization (the horizontal comparison), or from a combination of the two.

SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION

		Parts	Whole
SOCIAL TARGET	One	Trait	Person
	Many	Members	Group

Figure 1.   A schematic illustration of potential confounds between social target and social categorization variables

Fourth, Sears (1983) assessed judgments about persons, aggregates, and groups on different metrics. Persons were rated on a 3-point scale (as either 'mainly favourable', 'mainly unfavourable', or 'unfamiliar'); aggregates were rated by 'snap judgments of the proportion of a list of political leaders [. . .] they would evaluate favourably, shown so briefly, they could not be reviewed individually' (p. 237); and abstract groups were rated on 9-point scales. Comparisons of liking for different targets confounded the inclusiveness of the target with the measurement metric.

Alternative Dual-Process Accounts

A second line of integrative research was inspired by Campbell's (1958) concept of 'entitativity.' Individuals are perceived as being more coherently organized than groups, as having clearer boundaries, as being subjected to a common fate, or as sharing a common purpose. Whereas groups vary greatly on the continuum of entitativity, individual persons tend to reside at the top of the scale. In contrast to the person-positivity hypothesis, the entitativity hypothesis suggests that different mental processes are engaged in the perception of persons (high entitativity) and groups (low entitativity). Hamilton and Sherman (1996) proposed that perceivers are more inclined to search for underlying patterns when perceiving persons than when perceiving groups. Therefore, they may prefer serial or on-line processing in the former case and independent encoding of features in the latter (McConnell, Sherman, & Hamilton, 1994). Impressions formed on-line are held with greater confidence and allow more extreme judgments than impressions computed from memory. In other words, liking or disliking is often more extreme for individual than for group targets (Coovert & Reeder, 1990).

The present research introduces a third hypothesis about differences between person and group perception. Specifically, we propose that different variables predict the liking of persons and the liking of groups. Following an evolutionary line of thought, we suggest that the desirability of a person's characteristics is the primary determinant of how much a person is liked. Whether the perceiver possesses the same characteristics is less relevant. In social selection, people prefer associations with desirable rather than undesirable individuals. For example, they prefer kind persons to unkind ones regardless of the degree of kindness they attribute to themselves. The selection of mates is arguably an arena of great importance. Although there are some differences in what characteristics men and women consider desirable, both sexes employ their criteria fairly consistently. Men tend to select for beauty and youth because these characteristics signal fertility; women tend to select for dominance and wealth because these characteristics signal the ability to protect offspring (Buss & Schmitt, 1993; Darwin, 1871; Russell, 1930).

When people form impressions of groups, the desirability of members' characteristics may be less important in determining liking. We suggest that people assess whether they are members of the group or whether they could be members in the future. If they make this assessment, people need to know how well they fit into the group. In other words, they need to ask how similar their own characteristics are to the characteristics of various group members. In self-categorization theory, this assessment is expressed by a meta contrast between two sets of comparisons (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). The perceived differences between the self

and various group members constitute the first set of comparisons, and the perceived differences among those group members constitute the second set. If the mean of the first set is less than or equal to the mean of the second, the perceiver's fit with the group is good, and the group will appear likeable.

Extrapolating from these premises we developed the hypothesis that perceivers would use different strategies to evaluate individual persons and groups even if the available target information was identical. According to this hypothesis, the desirability of a person's characteristics would be the primary predictor of the liking of the person, whereas the similarity between the perceiver and the group would be the primary predictor of the liking of the group. To test this hypothesis, two sketches were developed, one positive and the other negative. Each sketch was edited to describe either an individual person or a group, while holding the content constant. Using the same information in descriptions of persons and groups is a necessity for the study of process differences (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). Moreover, the fictitious nature of the described targets guarded against familiarity effects or other influences of pre-existing beliefs, such as group stereotypes. Given this controlled set of input materials, any potential differences in the outcome variable, liking, could be attributed to differences in the use of desirability or similarity information. But only desirability, and not similarity, was manipulated directly, thus leaving open the possibility that the two variables could be correlated. Indeed, there was reason to believe that perceptions of similarity would go together with perceptions of desirability because most people attribute positive characteristics to themselves (Brown, 1986; Krueger, in press). It was to be expected that they perceive other persons as similar to the self inasmuch as these others had desirable characteristics. To disentangle the potential overlap between ratings of desirability and similarity, separate path analyses were performed in the person and the group condition.

METHOD

Design and Stimuli

Seventy-two undergraduate students (67 per cent female) participated in exchange for credit in an introductory psychology course. Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (target: person versus group) × 2 (description: negative versus positive) factorial design. Each participant read one of the four descriptions. The descriptions were brief narratives with a mix of behavioural and trait information that was equally plausible for an individual person ('John') or a group ('the Palladium Students Social club'). The desirability of the descriptions was varied by including different ratios of positive to negative items. Items with appropriate scale values were selected from Anderson's (1968) list of person-descriptive terms. The positive description comprised highly positive (e.g. … proven to be a sincere friend …) to somewhat negative behavioural items (e.g. … impractical side comes out …). The negative description comprised somewhat positive (e.g. … is quite studious …) to highly negative behaviour (e.g. … proven to be an insincere friend …). Two-thirds of the behaviours appeared in both descriptions (see Appendix 1 for the complete

text). A HyperCard program running on Macintosh IIci computers controlled the instructions, stimulus presentations, and data collection.

Measures and Procedure

The experiment was part of a session involving several unrelated social-judgment tasks. Participants were informed that they would read a description of behaviours of a student or a group of students at a large northeastern university. They were allowed as much time as they needed to read the description. Then, they rated how much they *liked* the target (0 = extreme dislike; 100 = extreme like), how *desirable* the description was (1 = not desirable; 9 = very desirable), and how much *similarity* they saw between themselves and the target (1 = not similar; 9 = very similar).

RESULTS

Participants' sex did not contribute any systematic variance on any of the measures and was henceforth ignored. The means and standard deviations of the three ratings are presented in Table 1. Each measure entered separate 2 (target) × 2 (description) analysis of variance (ANOVA). The effects of description supported the validity of the manipulations. Positive targets were liked better, $F(1,68) = 23.46$, $p < 0.001$, $\omega^2 = 0.24$, rated as being more desirable, $F(1,68) = 59.41$, $p < 0.001$, $\omega^2 = 0.45$, and were seen as more similar to the self, $F(1,68) = 16.33$, $p < 0.001$, $\omega^2 = 0.18$, than negative targets. The effect of target was not reliable for any of the three measures (all Fs < 1). The lack of a target effect is especially noteworthy for the liking measure because a main effect favouring the person relative to the group should have been expected on grounds of the person-positivity hypothesis.

The mean ratings of liking formed a pattern consistent with the entitativity hypothesis. The liking of the person tended to be more extreme than the liking of the group. However, the large variance in the ratings limited the power of the test of the interaction between target and description, $F(1,68) = 2.22$, $p = 0.14$, $\omega^2 = 0.02$. For desirability ratings, the interaction was reliable, $F(1,68) = 4.81$, $p < 0.05$, $\omega^2 = 0.05$, and its shape resembled the pattern found in the liking ratings. This consistency across measures suggested that the polarized liking of the person stemmed from

Table 1.   Mean ratings of liking, desirability, and similarity

| Description | Measure | Target | | | |
| | | Person | | Group | |
		M	*S.D.*	*M*	*S.D.*
Positive	Liking	68.84	(20.67)	59.89	(20.28)
	Desirability	6.95	(1.47)	5.83	(1.38)
	Similarity	5.00	(1.63)	5.11	(2.02)
Negative	Liking	39.16	(19.12)	44.17	(19.19)
	Desirability	3.06	(1.56)	3.67	(2.14)
	Similarity	2.78	(1.43)	3.78	(2.26)

Table 2. Correlations between liking, social desirability, and similarity

	Desirability	Similarity
Liking	0.69	0.63
Desirability	–	0.58

Note. All $ps < 0.01$.

differences in the desirability of the descriptions. The interpretation is consistent with the dual-process hypothesis. The interaction was not reliable for the similarity ratings, $F(1,68) = 1.05$, suggesting that this variable did not contribute to the liking bias.

To test the *dual-process hypothesis* directly, we examined individual differences in the three sets of ratings. Table 2 shows that ratings of liking, desirability, and similarity were positively correlated. Because the experimental manipulations directly affected the desirability of the target but not its similarity to the perceiver, one could surmise that there was greater variability undesirability than in similarity ratings. This was not the case, however, for either the person (S.D.s = 2.47 and 1.90 for desirability and similarity ratings, respectively), $F(36,36) = 1.69$, n.s., or the group (S.D.s = 2.09 and 2.22 for desirability and similarity ratings, respectively), $F(36,36) = 1.13$, n.s. These equalities of the variances permitted a direct test of the dual-process hypothesis.

The estimated path models yielded a good fit (see Figure 2), accounting for 63 per cent and 56 per cent of the variance for the person and the group conditions, respectively.[2] The relationship between desirability and similarity was comparable in the two models, with standardized path coefficients of 0.62 and 0.58 for person and group, respectively ($z^* = 0.24$, n.s.). The variance in liking due to residual factors was also comparable across models ($z^* = 0.41$, n.s.). What is most striking is that the person and the group models were virtual mirror images of each other. For the person, only desirability ratings were reliable predictors of liking ratings and they were better predictors than similarity ratings, $t(35) = 3.18$, $p < 0.01$. For the group, only similarity ratings were reliable predictors of liking ratings and they were better predictors than desirability ratings, $t(35) = 3.26$, $p < 0.01$. Comparing across targets, desirability was a better predictor of liking for the person than it was for the group, $z = 2.51$, $p < 0.05$. Conversely, similarity was a better predictor of liking for the group than it was for the person, $z = 2.40$, $p < 0.05$.[3]

DISCUSSION

The initial evidence supported the dual-process hypothesis of judgments of liking. The desirability of a person's characteristics uniquely predicted the liking of that person, and the perceived similarity between the perceiver and the group uniquely predicted the liking of that group. These findings depart sharply from the person-positivity bias. Had we followed the theory developed by Sears (1983), we would have expected greater liking for the person than for the group. Had we followed past research, we would at

[2]Because the three measures were taken concurrently, the path diagrams do not represent a temporal pattern of causal influence.
[3]Power analyses indicated high replicability for each of the reliable path coefficients (all power coefficients > 0.8).

Figure 2.   Path diagrams for the prediction of the liking of a person (left) and the liking of a group (right). *$p < 0.05$

least have expected greater liking for the person than for the group when the description was negative. Sears, for example, found the bias only for politicians, but not for university professors, a presumably better liked group. Similarly, Miller and Felicio (1990) found the person-positivity bias when the targets were unattractive but not when they were attractive. Extending our introductory concerns about person-positivity research, we are now sceptical that the biases found in earlier studies arose because participants perceived persons more than groups as being similar to themselves.[4] What appears to be more probable now is that people valued the desirable characteristics of the presented individuals but rejected the groups because they themselves did not belong to them. Anecdotal evidence for this asymmetry is in rich supply. Many Americans, for example, appreciate their Cape Verdian nanny, their Dominican gardener, or their German mother-in-law, but feel threatened by immigration *in the aggregate* (Moore, 1993). Like Will Rogers, many will never meet a man (or woman) they do not like, but they may dislike where he (or she) is coming from.

The entitativity hypothesis remains an intriguing possibility for future research. In the present study, entitativity was higher for the person than for the group. Of particular interest for future study is the possibility that the observed difference in processing strategy itself was a function of a difference in entitativity. Perhaps the liking of a group high in entitativity (e.g. the Rosicrucians or a local trade union) would be predicted better by desirability ratings than by similarity ratings. Some groups appear so coherent, structured, and uniform that perceivers may attribute to them the characteristics they normally expect only in sentient social organisms.

It seems less surprising now that different paradigms have dominated research on person perception and research on group perception. What *is* surprising is that much of the research on the liking of persons seems to have been focused on a process variable of marginal relevance. Newcomb (1961) observed that people like similar others more than they like dissimilar others. Byrne and colleagues conducted 'bogus-stranger' experiments to establish similarity as a cause of attraction. In that

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[4]No study on the person-positivity bias has directly tested the presumed mediating role of similarity ratings.

paradigm, participants evaluate another person whose putative attitudes or personality traits are either consistent or inconsistent with their own (Byrne & Clore, 1970; Byrne, Griffitt, & Stefaniak, 1967). This method confounds similarity with social desirability. People consider their own attitudes and traits to be desirable, and hence a stranger with desirable characteristics is also similar to themselves. As the present data have shown, the correlation between similarity and liking disappears when ratings of desirability are controlled (see also Stalling, 1970; Tesser, 1969). Moreover, people spontaneously report being attracted to another because of that person's desirable characteristics rather than because that person is similar to them (Aron, Dutton, Aron, & Iverson, 1989). At least as far as initial liking is concerned, the attraction paradigm appears to be a desirability paradigm in disguise. Only with time, interpersonal similarity begins to contribute independently to the liking of the other (Locke & Horowitz, 1990).

The stereotype paradigm was inspired by cross-cultural observations of ethnocentrism (Brewer & Campbell, 1976; Sumner, 1906). People like groups to which they belong (ingroups) more than groups to which they do not belong (outgroups; Howard & Rothbart, 1980). Various discriminatory behaviours indicate the disliking of outgroups. Participants in laboratory studies prefer to befriend ingroup members rather than outgroup members (Rabbie & Horwitz, 1969), and they favour ingroup members when allocating limited resources (Tajfel, 1970).

According to the dual-process hypothesis, ingroup favouritism should arise primarily from perceptions of dissimilarity rather than perceptions of negative outgroup characteristics. Since Freud's (1959/1926) speculations about the 'narcissism of small differences' investigators have demonstrated many ways in which people detect, exaggerate, and exploit intergroup differences for self-serving or ingroup-serving judgments (Krueger, 1992; Rothbart & Lewis, 1993). Perceptions of intergroup dissimilarity arise, in part, from asymmetries in projection from the self. Projection, or 'assumed similarity', extends to the ingroup but not to the outgroup (Krueger & Zeiger, 1993). Projections of ingroup similarity occur even when groups are formed arbitrarily (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; Krueger & Clement, 1996). In such minimal groups, participants know nothing about other group members' characteristics. Through projection, they assume other ingroup members are similar to themselves. Because they believe most of their own characteristics to be positive, they wind up projecting a positive image on the ingroup. Because they do not project to the outgroup, the image of the outgroup remains less favourable. When projection (assumed similarity) is controlled, ingroup favouritism nearly disappears; when desirability ratings are controlled, however, projection remains (Krueger, 1998; Krueger & Clement, 1994). These findings may explain why Sears's (1983) participants liked professors more than they liked politicians. Because the participants were students, professors belonged to an academic ingroup, whereas politicians did not. There did not have to be a difference in the desirability of the personal characteristics between these two groups to induce differences in liking.

If this analysis is correct, one would expect that perceptions of dissimilarity have a greater impact on discriminatory intergroup behaviour (disliking) than perceptions of negative characteristics do. The theory of symbolic racism makes a distinction similar to the present one. Symbolic racism is expressed by abstract resentments which are not tied to beliefs about specific outgroup characteristics. In contrast, perceptions of personal threats *are* tied to perceived group characteristics. In a well-known empirical

study, symbolic racism predicted discriminatory voting behaviour among white respondents better than perceived threats did (Kinder & Sears, 1981). A more recent study addressed this hypothesis even more directly. Most of the raters were secular Jews in Jerusalem neighbourhoods with a high percentage of ultraorthodox Jews (Struch & Schwartz, 1989). Again, perceptions of intergroup differences predicted intergroup aggression (disliking), whereas ingroup favouritism (i.e. the difference in the desirability of the traits attributed to the ingroup and the desirability of the traits attributed to the outgroup) did not.

The difference in the processes underlying the liking of persons and groups may help explain the resistance of negative stereotypes to change. There is little convincing evidence that attitudes toward specific outgroup members modify attitudes towards outgroups at large (Stephan, 1987). Rothbart and John (1985) presented a protype model of stereotype learning and change, positing that social observers assess the goodness of fit between an individual outgroup member and the group prototype. If the group member is similar to the prototype but differs from it on one critical dimension, the stereotype may change on *that* dimension. The model is pessimistic about generalized stereotype change because the disconfirmation of one stereotypic trait requires the simultaneous confirmation of several others. Like the research on projection, the prototype model attributes changes in the perception of groups primarily to judgments of similarity. Because the self is not associated with an outgroup, its desirable characteristics do not generalize, and thus, outgroup stereotypes lack positivity.

Beyond this pessimism, the dual-process hypothesis suggests a route to stereotype change. The crucial ingredient is a change in categorization. Stereotypes may improve if the perceiver reassesses the similarity between himself or herself and the group. Liking for a group may increase especially if the perceiver categorizes the self as a group member. This mechanism can produce increases in liking even without changes in the perceived desirability of the other group members' characteristics. In one elegant study, groups of six participants were categorized into two groups of three. Some remained categorized, whereas others were recategorized as members of a single group (Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & Dovidio, 1989). Discrimination prevailed in the two-group condition, whereas it was reduced in the recategorization condition.

Was Swift a philanthropist or a misanthrope? With the benefit of hindsight, we suggest the following interpretation of his paradoxical remark which opened this article. Swift probably tried to surround himself with others whose characteristics he admired. This strategy is reasonable enough and perhaps Swift was more successful at it than many others. At the same time, he may have failed to see himself as a member of many social groups. Without the benefit of the projection of his own, presumably favourable, characteristics to these groups he could only end up disliking them. It remains a mystery, however, why Swift could 'hate and detest that animal called man' without exempting himself from this largest of categories.

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APPENDIX 1: DESCRIPTIONS OF PERSONS AND GROUPS

Positive

John is a student (*the Palladium Students is a social club*) at a large, northeastern university. He (*one member, John*), often plays harmless pranks on his classmates, which has earned him a reputation for his humorous nature. For instance, a club which John holds membership in (*the club*), recently had a group photo made. John showed up to the session dressed in women's clothing. The photographer thought this was quite amusing. Occasionally, John's (*their*) impractical side comes out. For instance, John (*David*) almost always spends too much money ordering out for dinner

instead of cooking at home. At school, John's (*Jeff*) cooperative nature makes him an ideal partner for group projects. John (*Scott*) is quite studious. His good study habits have paid off as he has hopes of graduating next year with honours. John (*Mike*) has also been described as non-conformist as evidenced in the opinions that he holds. A recent topic of debate was whether a parking lot should be built on campus to accommodate both students and patrons of a local shopping mall. Most students were in support of the plan. But John (*Mike*) was vocal against the measure. He even went so far as to launch a 'save the field' protest. John (*William*) is popular because people have come to expect unpredictable behaviour from him. He (*Kevin*) has proven to be a sincere friend by helping others through difficult times.

Negative

John is a student (*The Palladium Students is a social club*) at a large, northeastern university. He (*one member, John*) often plays ill-fated pranks on his classmates, which has earned him a reputation for his irresponsible nature. For instance, a club which John holds membership in (*the club*), recently had a group photo made. John showed up to the session dressed in women's clothing. The photographer thought this was in poor taste. Occasionally, John's (*their*) impractical side comes out. For instance, John (*David*) almost always spends too much money ordering out for dinner instead of cooking at home. At school, John (*Jeff*) is often short-tempered when working with others on group projects. John (*Scott*) is quite studious. His good study habits have paid off as he has hopes of graduating next year with honours. John (*Mike*) has also been described as a non-conformist as evidenced in the opinions that he holds. A recent topic of debate was whether a parking lot should be built on campus to accommodate both students and patrons of a local shopping mall. Most students were against the plan. But John (*Mike*) was vocal in support of the measure. He even went so far as to launch a 'build the parking lot' campaign. John (*William*) is unpopular because people have come to expect unpredictable behaviour from him. He (*Kevin*) has proven to be an insincere friend by disclosing personal information entrusted to him by others.